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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

-vs-

:

ROBERT ROMERO,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
14371

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary
and theft in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge,
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty of theft and
burglary by a jury before the Honorable Peter F. Leary.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully seeks an affirmance of
the lower court decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 15, 1975, Russell and Jennifer Habeck
left their apartment.

Upon returning they found that

their television, stereo and an antique scale had been
stolen from their apartment (R.ll).

Russell Habeck

testified that the stolen articles were valued in
excess of $500 (R.9-10).

At the trial Mary Juarez,

the Habeck!s next door neighbor, testified that she
saw the defendant enter the Habeck1s home and carry out
stereo equipment and put it in a van.

Mary Juarez was

able to identify the defendant because she had met him
and seen him in the neighborhood several times (R.39-41).
Another neighbor, Connie Walters, also testified
that she saw the defendant enter the home and carry away
stereo equipment.

Ms. Walters was able to identify the

defendant by choosing his photograph out of a total of
40 pictures shown to her by the police (R.57-62).
Both eyewitnesses testified that the defendant
made several trips to and from the Habeckfs apartment,
carrying things and putting them into the van.

At no

time did the Habeckfs give authority to anyone to enter
their home (R.10).
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"Burglary
" " " A person
is guilty of burglary if he enters
or remains in a building with the
intent to commit a theft or a felony
or commit an assault on any perser."
Utah Code An- - ?^ ^ ^norM n o .
as amended.

"Theft. A person commits
theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control of property
of another with the intent to
deprive him thereof." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended.
The evidence introduced by the State which makes
out the prima facie case is as follows.

Russell Habeck

testified that property valued in excess of $500 was stolen
from his home (R.9-10).

He also testified that he had not

given authority to anyone to enter his home (R.10). Mary
Juarez, an eyewitness, testified that she saw the defendant
enter the home of the Habecks and carry out several items
(R.39-41).

Connie

Walters, another eyewitness, also

testified that she saw the defendant enter the home and
carry away the stolen items (R.57-62).
Such evidence was sufficient to at least take
the case to the jury for determination*
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS CLEARLY
SUFFICIENT THAT REASONABLE MINDS ACTING FAIRLY UPON IT
COULD HAVE FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
This Court in State v., Allgood, 2 8 Utah 2d 119,
499 P.2d 269 (1972), set forth the standard upon which
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this Court will review a jury verdict to determine whether
or not there was sufficient evidence presented in the lower
court to convict the defendant.

This Court said:

"To set aside a jury verdict
the evidence must appear so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that
reasonable minds acting fairly
upon it must have entertained
reasonable doubt that defendant
committed the crime." Id. at
269-270.
This standard was reaffirmed in State v. Mills,
530 P.2d 1272 (1975), where this Court stated further:
"Unless the evidence compels
such a conclusion as a matter of
law the verdict must be sustained.
In evaluating the evidence, is it
so inherently improbable as to be
unworthy of belief, that, upon
objective analysis it appears
reasonable minds could not believe
beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant was guilty?" IdL at
1272, 1273.
This Court, in accord with long established
precedent, has held it will not review the sufficiency of
evidence as to the rectitude of an appellant's conviction
unless there is a clear showing that the evidence could not
support the conviction.

State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162,

350 P.2d 146 (1960).
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There is a strong presumption attached to the
validity of the trial court judgment and every reasonable
intendment must be indulged in support of such judgment,
until and unless the complaining party can demonstrate the
error of such judgment.
In State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d
196 (1967), this Court said:
"It is our duty to respect
the prerogative of the jury as the
exclusive judges of the credibility
of the witnesses and as the determiners
of facts. Consequently, we assume that
they believed the statefs evidence, and
we survey it, together with all fair
inferences that the jury could reasonably
draw therefrom, in the light most favorable to their verdict." Id. at 197.
In the instant case, there is no affirmative showing
that conviction waS obtained without sufficiency of evidence.
The grounds raised by the appellant cannot be sustained either
on the basis of the presumption or clearly demonstrated by
the record.
In the instant case, the victim Russell Habeck
testified that he had certain property in his home which was
stolen (R.ll).

Mr. Habeck valued the property at a bare

minimum of $550 (R.9-10).

Mary Juarez, a next door neighbor

of the victim, testified that she saw the defendant carrying
{
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the stolen property from the Habeck home.

She was able to

recognize the defendant because she had previously met his
acquaintance (R.39-41).

She stated, "I know him very well,

I recognize him right away." (R.94).
Another eyewitness, Connie Walters, who lived a
few houses down, testified and described the same people
and the same stolen articles which the first eyewitness,
Mary Juarez, testified to.

Connie Walters was able to

identify the defendant by choosing his picture from among
a total of 40 pictures altogether (R.57-62).

It is clear

from the record that there was sufficient evidence whereby
the issue was properly submitted to the jury and that the
jury acting fairly and reasonably upon the evidence could
have found, as it did, that the appellant was guilty of
the crimes of burglary and theft.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient
evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt because of
the credibility of the statefs two eyewitnesses.

It has

been long established that it is the prerogative of the
jury to judge the weight of the evidence, the credibility
of the wintesses and the facts to be found therefrom.
State v. Mills, supra.
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The jury can find not only facts directly proved
by the evidence but any additional facts which are reasonable
inferences of the facts proved*

State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d

313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964).
Therefore, appellant's claim of insufficient
evidence based upon the credibility of the state's two eyewitnesses is totally frivolous and without merit.

Respondent

submits that the evidence presented at trial was clearly
sufficient that reasonable minds acting fairly upon it could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
POINT III
IF IT APPEARS THAT THE JURY ACTING FAIRLY AND
REASONABLY COULD FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT,

THE VERDICT SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED.
For the defendant to prevail on an assertion of

insufficiency of evidence:
" . . . it must appear that
viewing the evidence and all fair
inferences reasonably to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, reasonable minds, could not believe them
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
but would necessarily entertain
some substantial doubt of their
guilt." State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d
110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957) .
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Also, it is settled that a jury verdict will not be
reversed merely because reasonable minds may have had
a reasonable doubt or that conflicting inferences might
have been drawn from the evidence.

As stated in the

Sullivan case:
"But it is not sufficient
merely that reasonable minds may
have entertained such doubt.
Before a verdict may properly
be set aside it must appear that
the evidence was so inconclusive
or unsatisfactory that reasonable
minds acting fairly upon it must
have entertained reasonable doubt
that defendants committed the
crime." 302 P.2d 212.
Finally, this Court in State v. Lamb, 102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d
805 (1942), said:
"It is not our province on
appeal to judge the credibility of
witnesses when their testimony is
in direct conflict. We are concerned
only with the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the convictions by showing that the
jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were
guilty." 131 P.2d at 809.
Thus, it can be seen that the verdict of the jury
will be given great weight, and it will only be reversed if
it is shown that there is no evidence upon which it could
reasonably be based.

In the instant case it is clear from
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the record that there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury verdict and therefore it should not be disturbed•
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that there
was sufficient evidence whereby the issue was properly
submitted to the jury and that the jury acting fairly and
reasonably upon the evidence could have found, as it did,
that the appellant was guilty of the crimes of burglary
and theft.
The respondent further submits that this Court
should not disturb those findings of fact and should
affirm the conviction of the appellant as adjudged in
the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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